a. First Possible Solution and the Weighing of it

109. With respect to this question it seems one should say no as to the lower reason, and consequently as to the lower will too.

110. The proof is multiple:

The first is that the same power cannot have opposite acts about the same object when one of these acts is exercised to its fullest, for one opposite, when at its fullest, is not compatible with the other. But the lower and higher part are one power (according to Augustine On the Trinity 12, and it was shown in Lectura 2 d.24 nn.7-12), and the higher part at its fullest in intellect prescribes the passion to be wanted, and at its fullest in will supremely wants it;     therefore the lower part could not not-want it.

111. Again, from a principle and conclusion opposite results do not follow; the principle of lower practical reason is a conclusion of higher reason; therefore etc     . Proof of the minor: practical first principles are taken from the ultimate end; directed to that end are other ends from which are taken the principles of the lower reason, so that the goodness of these other ends comes from that end; therefore the principles taken from the other ends are proved from those taken from that end.

112. Again: in whatever way the principles of the lower reason are disposed (namely whether they are conclusions, as the preceding argument assumed [n.111], or are immediate, though posterior to the immediate first principles taken from the ultimate end; for there can, as it seems, be an order of dignity between the practical and theoretical immediate principles), this at any rate is certain, that opposites cannot both be demonstrated but one of them would be the result of sophistical argument. Therefore, if the higher reason demonstrates that ‘this thing is to be willed’, then from no principles save sophistical ones can the lower reason argue that it is to be absolutely not willed. Now we are supposing that Christ’s right reason was not in error through sophisms, and that his will was in conformity with right reason and not sophistical reason.

113. Again, the reason which judges about the acts of the political virtues is lower reason; but it judges that ‘death is to be endured willingly’ for the common good; so Christ’s lower reason could not have concluded that death was not to be willed, but rather would have concluded the opposite.

114. If it be said that right reason judges that death is to be endured but not that it is not to be willed, so that its being not to be willed, and thus its being sad, is a conclusion drawn from something else (and even Aristotle seems to agree with this in the citation above [n.103] about the brave man, and Augustine too [n.102] and his reason, that an act of the virtue of patience is willingly chosen but the object the act concerns is not) — on the contrary: the conclusion that death is now to be endured is drawn by reason, and either the will does not will what is concluded now and then it is not right, or it does will and then it seems not absolutely not to will death; for an absolute and efficacious volition of a does not stand along with an absolute and efficacious not wanting of that without which a cannot be, for then it would flee and not flee the same thing at the same time. For an absolute and efficacious not-wanting is the cause of fleeing from what is not wanted, just as an absolute and efficacious wanting is the cause of pursuing what is wanted.

115. Again, there are authorities that seem to be for the principal conclusion [n.109]:

Augustine On Psalms ps.21, “Is the soldier who is to be crowned not afraid, namely Paul, and the Lord who is going to be crowned is afraid...?” meaning to say ‘not so’; fear is about something not wanted which is known or believed to be in future;     therefore etc     .

116. Again, the Master in the text (and he is quoting Jerome) maintains there is not passion in Christ but pro-passion; but if Christ did absolutely not want it then, since such not wanting follows the full apprehension of reason, the sadness following such not wanting would seem to possess the full idea of passion.

117. Anyone who would be pleased with the conclusion of these arguments and authorities could say that Christ’s lower will, as it is free, did not absolutely not want death but was nevertheless saddened because he conditionally did not want it, namely as far as was in himself, provided God’s good pleasure could be fulfilled in some other way.

118. Now some people say, that in this sort of case there is a combination of the voluntary and involuntary, and that what is willed simply is what someone wills as far as is in himself, and that what is not willed in a certain respect is what someone wills because of a present necessity (for example: what is voluntary simply for someone in danger at sea is not to cast his merchandise overboard; or alternatively, what is involuntary simply for someone in such danger is to cast his merchandise overboard, so his casting overboard causes him sadness, and is voluntary in a certain respect); and so these people would say that in the matter at hand Christ did absolutely not want death but that insofar as it concerned him and in a certain respect he did will it. As to this view I say it is false both generally and in the matter at hand.

119. First, generally, the point is shown by the case of the man in danger at sea; for since he is lord of his acts by his will, in whose power it is to use his motive force or to not use it to throw his goods overboard, and that this is as much in his power in danger as otherwise, therefore he then casts his goods overboard simply voluntarily, because he is not then coerced by anyone to use his motive force for the purpose. For it is plain that his will could love the merchandise so inordinately that it would not want to throw them overboard even to avoid danger.

120. Next, as to the matter in hand, Christ does not seem not to want death, save with a diminishing determination, namely ‘if something else could be well done instead’; and this determination is a diminishing one because the condition in question does not exist.

121. Now, according to this way, a ‘willing to die’ without any diminishing condition is conceded; for if the addition is made that he willed to die ‘for the honor of God’ or ‘for the sake of justice’ or ‘for the salvation of men’, then the end of the action does not, in these cases, diminish the act; therefore what someone does or suffers in this way does not make the act to be simply unwilled but to be so in a certain respect, namely insofar as it is up to him.

122. But a motive perhaps for taking the opposite side is that such a determination is sad simply — just as ‘throwing overboard’ is sad for a man in danger on the sea and ‘dying’ sad for a brave man.

123. But this is not compelling (for the opposite side), because a conditioned not-wanting, when the condition is not wanted, is sufficient for being sad simply, and so the wanting consequent to some unwanted condition is not sufficient for being glad, as in the case of the merchant where a ‘willing to throw overboard’ follows on ‘there will be a storm’, which is something he does not want.

124. But then Christ’s death does not seem sad, for it is not the case that it was unwanted because of some pre-supposed unwanted thing.

125. I reply: just as a brave citizen would not want his city to undergo a necessity of such sort that the city’s being freed from it would require his own death (and so the necessity is here pre-supposed as something he does not want), so Christ did not want his hearers to be such that they could not have the truth preached to them without being scandalized into mortal hatred. Therefore, if he wanted to die for the truth of his teaching, something he did not want is presupposed on the part of his hearers. And if he wanted to die for the salvation of the human race, something else he did not want is pre-supposed, namely that men are in the sort of state that his death was needed to snatch them from it. And if he wanted to die because of the divine good pleasure, there too something Christ did not want seems to be pre-supposed, for the divine good pleasure had his death for object and for the sake, as it seems, of some end to which this object was ordained, and this end is either the preaching of the truth or the procuring of men’s salvation.

126. So then, if these last arguments be sound [nn.119-125], one would have to say, in brief, that Christ did not, in his lower part, want death or the passion — and did not want it both by his will as it is a nature (that is, as it is conjoined with the suffering sense appetite [n.106]) and by his will as it is free, insofar as it thus only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [n.117] — the way said before about the higher part, that this part as it is a nature did not want it [n.95-97], and that as free it only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [nn.101, 98]. And so he was saddened in both parts in the same ways. Nor is it valid to say, ‘he did not want it absolutely,     therefore he was not saddened’, since a conditional not-wanting suffices for being saddened simply; hence, one can only argue, ‘he did not want it absolutely, therefore he was not saddened for this reason’ — but compatible with this is that he was saddened simply for some other reason (a single reason or a double one).

127. Thus is the gloss fulfilled [Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, psalm 87.4] “‘My soul is filled with evils etc     .,’ that is with sadnesses and pains,” because his whole soul was saddened in will as to both respects, both as will is nature and as it is free (with a conditional not-wanting, namely as far as it was up to him), and his whole soul as to its intellect in both its parts apprehended something naturally and conditionally disagreeable to will.